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Note 
 
Going Back in Time: The Search for Retroactive 
Rulemaking Power in Statutory Deadlines 
Chris Schmitter*
In 2010, American fuel refiners faced a mess. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) had long since missed a 
2008 congressional deadline to update the rules that govern the 
production of renewable fuels.
 
1 Because EPA failed to act, the 
refiners started 2010 under the old rules.2 However, by July 1 
of that year, long after Congress’s deadline, EPA finally imple-
mented the new rules and, to make up for lost time, made them 
retroactive to all of 2010.3 In other words, the requirements 
companies had to meet for January through June suddenly in-
creased, retroactively, after July 1.4 Refiners were outraged at 
these retroactive regulations5
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2006, 
Georgetown University. Thank you to Professor Kristin Hickman, who helped 
me develop this topic, spent a significant amount of time reviewing multiple 
drafts, and has been an amazing mentor. Thank you to the board and staff of 
Minnesota Law Review, for their help in publishing this piece and for the hon-
or of getting to work with them on Volume 97. And thank you to Erin Bailey, 
whose love and support during my time in law school has meant more to me 
than I can possibly express in words. Copyright © 2013 by Chris Schmitter.  
 and challenged them in federal 
 1. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA (Nat’l Petrochemical & 
Refiners Ass’n I), 630 F.3d 145, 147–52 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, 643 F.3d 
958 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 571 (2011).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. It is important to note that refiners could not simply have con-
formed their behavior to the requirements found in the statute, without wait-
ing for EPA to act. The relevant statute sets nationwide annual goals for the 
volume of renewable fuels produced, but it leaves to EPA the determination of 
what the relevant percentage should be for individual refiners. Id.  
 5. Brief for Petitioners at 14–18, Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 
630 F.3d 145 (No. 10-1070) (noting the significant changes included in the new 
rules and arguing that a company that imported diesel fuel in February of 
2010 would not have had any reporting requirements under the old rule, but 
would be retroactively encompassed by the new rules).  
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court.6 In a surprising decision, however, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit approved 
EPA’s retroactive action.7
This scenario may seem irrelevant to all but a handful of 
companies and curious administrative law scholars. In reality, 
however, many government agencies are currently facing un-
precedented pressure to craft retroactive rules. In the wake of 
the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform bill, 
agencies are promulgating a “tsunami” of new rules.
 
8 They are 
generating many of these rules by specific statutory deadlines 
and it is likely that agencies will miss some deadlines9
Whether retroactivity appears in statutes or rules, the Su-
preme Court has held that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the 
law.”
 and be 
forced to consider whether to give these rules retroactive effect. 
10 Indeed, the Court has stated that retroactive rulemak-
ing is only appropriate when Congress has explicitly authorized 
it.11 Despite this prohibition, some judges, including Justice 
Scalia, have proposed an exception that would allow agencies to 
promulgate retroactive rules if they miss a statutory deadline.12
 
 6. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 146–47. 
 
In other words, if an agency fails to meet a deadline for imple-
menting a rule, it could later promulgate that same rule retro-
active to the statutory deadline it missed, even absent explicit 
congressional authorization. In response to the fuel-refiner sce-
 7. Id. at 162–64. 
 8. See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly & Melissa D. Berry, The Tsunami of 
Health Care Rulemaking: Strategies for Survival and Success, 63 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 245, 246–47 (2011) (“There is no question that PPACA will result in a 
tsunami of new administrative rulemaking.”); Amanda Engstrom, Dodd-Frank 
Unleashes a Tsunami of Regulation: A Visual, FREE ENTERPRISE (Jan. 24, 
2011), http://www.freeenterprise.com/2011/01/dodd-frank-unleashes-a-tsunami 
-of-regulation-a-visual (anticipating the “regulatory tsunami” and providing a 
chart which lists the rulemakings that will occur during the implementation of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform legislation). 
 9. Jean Eaglesham, Overhaul Grows and Slows, WALL ST. J., May 2, 
2011, at C1 (“The sheer number of rules still in the pipeline makes it almost 
inevitable agencies will miss an increasing number of deadlines over the next 
year.” (quotations omitted)). 
 10. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).  
 11. Id.  
 12. See id. at 224–25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If, for example, a statute 
prescribes a deadline by which particular rules must be in effect, and if the 
agency misses that deadline, the statute may be interpreted to authorize a 
reasonable retroactive rule despite the limitation of the [Administrative Pro-
cedure Act].”); see also Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 162–
63 (adopting Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Bowen as authoritative). 
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nario described above, the D.C. Circuit adopted this very excep-
tion in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, shock-
ing many regulated parties13 and spurring a heated debate on 
the D.C. Circuit.14
The issue at the center of this intense debate is the focus of 
the discussion that follows. This Note analyzes what it calls the 
tardy-agency problem: the unresolved question of whether an 
agency is authorized to promulgate a retroactive rule after 
missing a statutory deadline, without explicit authorization 
from Congress. With agencies facing myriad new deadlines, the 
tardy-agency problem is critically important for regulated par-
ties. In light of National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, regu-
lated entities that might usually assume agency rules can only 
be applied prospectively, must now ask whether retroactivity is 
allowed when agencies miss deadlines. Furthermore, this issue 
carries broader implications for government effectiveness and 
the political struggle between the President and Congress. 
While allowing retroactive rulemaking might weaken the effect 
of statutory deadlines, barring retroactivity might allow a Pres-
ident who disagrees with Congress’s policy to miss agency 
deadlines in order to grant reprieve to regulated parties and 
flout the will of the legislative branch.
 
15 Despite the urgency of 
this issue for regulated parties and the broader concerns it 
raises, there has been little scholarship on retroactive rulemak-
ing broadly and no scholarship on the tardy-agency problem 
specifically.16 And the case law on this issue includes little help-
ful reasoning to guide courts or parties in the future.17
 
 13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27–30, Nat’l Petrochemical & Refin-
ers Ass’n v. EPA (Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n III), 132 S. Ct. 571 
(2011) (No. 11-102) (expressing deep concern over the D.C. Circuit’s holding 
and its potential effect on fuel refiners and other parties facing large regulato-
ry schemes).  
 Courts 
 14. Compare Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 162–63 
(stating that the D.C. Circuit has accepted Justice Scalia’s view that an excep-
tion to the general rule against retroactive rulemaking exists when an agency 
misses a statutory deadline), with Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. 
EPA (Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n II), 643 F.3d 958, 959–62 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (Brown, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing 
that the exception “conflicts with the Supreme Court’s clear-statement rules, 
usurps legislative power, renders statutory deadlines precatory, multiples un-
certainty for regulated entities, and encourages lethargic administration”). 
 15. See infra Part II.F. 
 16. See infra Part I for a discussion of the existing relevant case law and 
scholarship.  
 17. See Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 162–63 (adopt-
ing Justice Scalia’s exception to the prohibition on retroactive rulemaking but 
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and regulated parties are left with only the standard reasoning 
and rules that apply to traditional cases of retroactive rulemak-
ing. This critical problem demands a more nuanced solution.  
This Note fills the vacuum of scholarship on the tardy-
agency problem. Part I introduces the relevant case law and 
scholarship and reviews the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
retroactivity. Part II analyzes the reasoning courts frequently 
use to justify the prohibition on retroactive rulemaking and ex-
plains why this reasoning is insufficient to answer the tardy-
agency problem. Part III proposes a new model that empowers 
agencies to use retroactive rulemaking in the tardy-agency 
problem scenario when Congress implicitly authorizes it. Part 
III concludes by explaining how this approach is consistent 
with administrative law principles and how it addresses the 
competing policy interests presented by this important prob-
lem.  
I.  THE TARDY-AGENCY PROBLEM AND THE DOCTRINES 
THAT GOVERN RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING   
Before considering the doctrines that govern retroactive 
rulemaking, it is necessary to explain why the tardy-agency 
problem exists at all. Keeping in mind that that the Supreme 
Court has enunciated a general bar on retroactive rulemak-
ing,18
A. AGENCY POWER AND STATUTORY DEADLINES 
 it is helpful to consider what makes the tardy-agency 
problem unique. The key distinction is the existence of a statu-
tory deadline that the relevant agency has missed.  
Agencies consistently face a large number of statutory 
deadlines, requiring them to promulgate rules and take specific 
actions by certain dates.19 This is especially true today, when 
agencies face a “tsunami” of rules required under recently en-
acted laws.20
 
focusing on the unique statutory scheme in the case and failing to provide 
guidance on when the exception applies more broadly). 
 As National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n 
demonstrates, it is entirely possible for an agency to miss a 
 18. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 19. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1079 (5th 
ed. 2010) (recognizing that Congress imposes a large number of statutory 
deadlines on agencies and criticizing this practice because “Congress estab-
lishes so many deadlines for so many actions by the same agency that the 
agency cannot possibly use the presence of a deadline as an indication that 
Congress attaches a priority to one or a few actions”). 
 20. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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statutory deadline.21
If an agency misses a deadline, courts must first determine 
whether that agency retains the power to act. One might intui-
tively assume that an agency, after missing a statutory dead-
line, would lose whatever power Congress gave it.
 As such, courts have developed principles 
to govern agency delay. 
22 However, in 
response to a split amongst the federal courts of appeals on this 
issue,23 the Supreme Court held in 2003 that agencies generally 
do retain the power to act.24 In Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 
the Court considered a challenge to the Commissioner of Social 
Security’s decision to exercise the power, under federal law, to 
assign retired coal workers to coal companies for retirement 
benefits.25 The relevant statute required the Commissioner to 
complete “all assignments before October 1, 1993,” but the 
Commissioner did not meet that deadline and assigned some 
10,000 people after October 1.26 In response, the Court held 
that the Commissioner still retained the power to act after the 
deadline passed.27 Although the statute used strong language 
(e.g., the word “shall”), the Court held that, absent language 
from Congress dictating what penalty to apply to a tardy agen-
cy, courts would neither take away an agency’s power nor im-
pose other “coercive sanction.”28
This counterintuitive doctrine raises important questions 
about agency delay and retroactivity. In a hypothetical tardy-
agency problem, an agency has missed a deadline and, in mov-
ing to create a rule that still meets the intent of Congress, must 
decide whether to promulgate that rule back to the statutory 
deadline. While Barnhart does not address retroactivity, it does 
demonstrate that a statutory deadline signifies a temporal 
 
 
 21. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 147–52. 
 22. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administra-
tive Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 954–56 (2008) (describing the “most plausible 
inference” that an agency loses its power after its statutory authority expires). 
 23. PIERCE, supra note 19, at 1088.  
 24. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159–60 (2003). 
 25. Id. at 152–54.  
 26. Id. at 155–56.  
 27. Id. at 157–59. 
 28. Id. at 159. Barnhart extends to cases in which an agency has not 
promulgated a rule by a specific statutory deadline for doing so. See Gersen & 
O’Connell, supra note 22, at 954–56.  
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preference on the part of Congress and that agencies retain 
significant power despite the passage of a deadline.29
B. AGENCIES AND RETROACTIVITY 
  
Congress has delegated significant authority to agencies, 
including the power to take substantive policymaking action.30 
Congress delegates this power through specific statutes, often 
called “organic statutes,” that create and empower agencies.31 
An organic statute serves as the primary authority on an agen-
cy’s power, with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) laying 
out general standards and procedural rules that apply only 
when an organic statute leaves a gap in its coverage.32
Agencies can take policymaking action in one of two ways. 
First, agencies can interpret statutes and announce policies 
and standards through case-by-case adjudication.
 
33 Second, 
agencies can do the same through rulemaking, under the pro-
cedures outlined in the APA.34
1. Adjudication 
 Agencies can use both of these 
policymaking tools to take retroactive action, but the limits on 
their ability to act retroactively in each context vary.  
Agencies regularly engage in adjudication that covers a 
wide range of topics. From complex employment cases under 
the National Labor Relations Board to the simple processing of 
a Social Security claim, agencies spend a significant portion of 
their time and resources adjudicating claims, requests, and 
disputes.35 While agency adjudication can take many forms,36
 
 29. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 
 
22, at 954–56 (analyzing the im-
portant implications of the holding in Barnhart).  
 30. PIERCE, supra note 19, at 408 (discussing the delegation of power by 
Congress to agencies to make substantive rules).  
 31. Id. 
 32. See Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure 
and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 486 n.59 (2003) (noting 
that the APA’s provisions serve as gap-fillers and that the relevant organic 
statute trumps the APA where the two conflict). 
 33. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
§ 8123 (2012) (discussing the power of an agency to decide whether to use ad-
judication or rulemaking to make policy).  
 34. Id.  
 35. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 19, at 702 (giving examples of agency ad-
judications and noting that agencies conduct “millions of adjudications each 
year,” far more than the courts). 
 36. Id.  
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scholars and courts often analogize agency adjudications to the 
decision-making process of courts.37 Agencies can, and often do, 
use adjudication to look beyond the case at hand and interpret 
federal statutes or announce new polices, standards, or guide-
lines.38
In response to agency policymaking through adjudication, 
the Supreme Court, in the landmark case SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., held that agencies can make the interpretations and pol-
icies they announce in adjudicatory proceedings retroactive.
  
39 
Specifically, the Court stated that the negative effects of retro-
activity must be balanced against the negative effects of “pro-
ducing a result which is contrary to a statutory design.”40
There are limitations, however, on the extent of an agen-
cy’s power to make adjudicatory decisions retroactive. The D.C. 
Circuit distinguishes between adjudicatory rules that substi-
tute “new law for old law that was reasonably clear” and those 
that are merely “new applications of [existing] law, clarifica-
tions and additions.”
  
41 While an adjudicatory rule that substi-
tutes new law for old “may justifiably be given prospectively-
only effect in order to protect the settled expectations of those 
who have relied on the preexisting rules,”42 a rule that is simply 
a new application of existing law carries “a presumption of ret-
roactivity” that courts adhere to unless the retroactivity leads 
to “manifest injustice.”43
 
 37. See, e.g., id. at 894 (noting that the agency adjudicatory decision-
making process resembles and is often based on that of courts). 
 In one of the key cases to come out of 
 38. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (acknowledging 
that agencies cannot announce every principle in the form of a rule and hold-
ing that “administrative agenc[ies] must be equipped to act either” through 
rulemaking or adjudication); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 
267, 294 (1974) (summarizing court precedent and reiterating that an agency 
is “not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceed-
ing and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies” with the 
agency in question).  
 39. See Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 202 (holding that an agency must be 
able to make policies either by general rule or by individual order and that 
giving such policies retroactive effect would not automatically invalidate 
them); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 224 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[N]othing prevents the agency from acting retroac-
tively through adjudication.”). 
 40. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 203. 
 41. Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 269 F.3d 1098, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quot-
ing Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 91 F.3d 1478, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
 42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43. Qwest Servs. Corp. v. FCC, 509 F.3d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quot-
ing AT&T v. FCC, 454 F.3d 329, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
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Chenery Corp.,44 the D.C. Circuit established a multi-factor bal-
ancing test to assess whether retroactive adjudicatory action is 
appropriate.45 The Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union 
test asks (1) whether the case is “one of first impression,” (2) 
whether the rule is “an abrupt departure from well established 
practice,” (3) to what extent the regulated party in question re-
lied on the previous rule, (4) what is the burden on the regulat-
ed party, and (5) what is the “statutory interest in applying a 
new rule.”46
2. Rulemaking 
 Thus, within the confines of the test above, adjudi-
cation is a process agencies regularly use to make policies and 
rules that have retroactive effect.  
As noted above, agencies can make substantive policy 
through rulemaking. Agencies largely make substantive rules, 
called legislative rules, through the so-called “notice-and-
comment” procedures outlined in Section 553 of the APA.47 Be-
fore discussing retroactive rulemaking, however, it is necessary 
to make several points. First, it is not always clear whether an 
agency’s action is retroactive. Courts define a retroactive rule 
as one that “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired un-
der existing law, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new du-
ty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or 
considerations already past.”48 Second, while agencies make 
policy through substantive legislative rules, they can frequently 
use interpretative rules to put forth interpretations of relevant 
statutes.49
 
 44. See, e.g., William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative 
Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J. 106, 113 (describing the central role the test ex-
plained above has played in assessing retroactive adjudicatory actions). 
 These interpretative rules do not carry the same 
 45. Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 46. Id. But see Verizon Tel. Cos., 269 F.3d at 1109–10 (acknowledging the 
importance of the Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union test but also 
admitting that the D.C. Circuit has applied other similar tests in assessing the 
reasonableness of retroactive adjudicatory action). 
 47. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 19, at 561–69 (describing the tendency of 
agencies to use the procedures outlined in Section 553 of the APA, called “no-
tice-and-comment” rulemaking, to make rules). 
 48. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 859 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (quoting Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 177 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999)); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (us-
ing a similar definition to describe retroactive statutes).  
 49. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—Interpretative, Legis-
lative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 928–34 (1948) (providing a still-
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weight that legislative rules do and, therefore, do not fall under 
any bar on retroactive rulemaking.50 The tardy-agency problem 
does not involve agency interpretative rules. Finally, there is a 
distinction between instances in which an agency proactively 
gives a rule retroactive effect and when an agency applies a 
current rule retroactively.51
Agencies’ ability to engage in retroactive rulemaking 
changed in 1988.
 This discussion focuses on the for-
mer.  
52 The Supreme Court’s decision in Bowen v. 
Georgetown University Hospital reduced the ability of agencies 
to apply rules retroactively.53 Although lower courts have de-
veloped the retroactive rulemaking analysis further since Bow-
en,54
a. Pre-Bowen 
 it is helpful to break down the retroactive rulemaking ju-
risprudence into pre- and post-Bowen eras. 
Prior to the Bowen decision in 1988, agencies regularly 
“engaged in retroactive rulemaking.”55 Although there is little 
case law dealing with retroactive rulemaking prior to Bowen,56
 
illuminating discussion on the difference, both real and theoretical, between 
legislative and interpretative rules).  
 
decisions by the Supreme Court and the lower courts do provide 
some guidance on the issue. In Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit 
Products, Inc., prior to the enactment of the APA, the Supreme 
Court considered regulatory exemptions from the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, promulgated by the Administrator of the Wage 
 50. See id. at 958–59 (arguing that where interpretative rules do not 
change law, their retroactivity poses no problem, but that in the more common 
instance when they do change law, their retroactivity should be dealt with like 
legislative rules).  
 51. See Luneburg, supra note 44, at 122–23 (explaining the difference be-
tween retroactive application of a regulation and proactive efforts to promul-
gate a retroactive rule).  
 52. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); see also 
PIERCE, supra note 19, at 482 (claiming that Bowen “drastically” changed the 
body of law governing retroactive rulemaking). 
 53. PIERCE, supra note 19, at 485 (asserting that the Bowen decision will 
likely force agencies to make retroactive policy through the adjudicatory pro-
cess). 
 54. Id. at 487–95 (discussing how the lower courts have applied Bowen in 
retroactive rulemaking decisions since 1988).  
 55. Id. at 481.  
 56. See Luneburg, supra note 44, at 122 (pointing out that, before Bowen, 
“there were relatively few cases in which the Supreme Court directly confront-
ed the question of agency authority to act retroactively through” rulemaking). 
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and Hour Division.57 The Court held that the exemptions went 
beyond the reach of the statute and invalidated them.58 The 
Court directed the Administrator to promulgate new regula-
tions and to make those regulations retroactive.59 Although the 
Court acknowledged the dangers of retroactive rulemaking, it 
ultimately found that any other result would produce outcomes 
“contrary to the statutory design” and held that retroactivity 
was the “lesser evil.”60
While their decisions vary, the lower courts largely applied 
some variation of the Retail, Wholesale & Department Store 
Union test to cases of retroactive rulemaking, despite the fact 
that the D.C. Circuit created it for adjudication.
  
61 Under this 
test, lower courts sometimes found retroactivity permissible. In 
Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit affirmed 
the FCC’s decision to change an application process for certain 
regulated parties.62 In doing so, the court applied Chenery Corp. 
and the Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union balancing 
test and found that the impact on the regulated parties was 
minimal and that the interest of the FCC in efficiently proc-
essing applications was significant.63 In Citizens to Save Spen-
cer County v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit considered a decision by 
EPA to give two rules retroactive effect.64
 
 57. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 608–09 (1944). 
While rule-like actions taken by the Wage and Hour Division are generally in-
terpretative, the Court considers these rules as being legislative and thus the 
case informs the modern debate on retroactive rulemaking. See Davis, supra 
note 
 The court upheld 
EPA’s actions, arguing that the retroactivity was reasonable 
because it minimally affected the parties, the parties had suffi-
cient notice, and the agency qualified under the APA for a good-
49, at 932 n.63 (stating that the Court considered the Administrator’s 
regulation here to be legislative); see also Luneburg, supra note 44, at 122–23 
(discussing Addison’s significance without focusing on the distinction between 
interpretative and legislative rules).  
 58. Addison, 322 U.S. at 619 (“[T]he regulations . . . are ultra vires.”).  
 59. Id. at 620 (“The accommodation that we are making assumes . . . that 
the Administrator will retrospectively act . . . . To be sure this will be a retro-
spective judgment, and law should avoid retroactivity as much as possible. But 
other possible dispositions likewise involve retroactivity, with the added mis-
chief of producing a result contrary to the statutory design.”).  
 60. Id. at 620–22. 
 61. See Luneburg, supra note 44, at 113.  
 62. Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551, 1555–56 (D.C. Cir. 
1987).  
 63. Id. 
 64. Citizens to Save Spencer Cnty. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 879–80 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). 
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cause exception to the law’s normal procedural requirements.65 
In another case, the First Circuit upheld a retroactive Medicare 
regulation after comparing “the public interest in the retroac-
tive rule with the private interests that are overturned by it.”66
Other courts, applying the same standard, held retroactivi-
ty impermissible. In Mason General Hospital v. Secretary of the 
Department of Health & Human Services, for example, the 
Sixth Circuit invalidated the department’s attempt to apply a 
rule retroactively back to 1979.
  
67 The court applied a modified 
version of the Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union test, 
focusing largely on the need to comply with the statutory pur-
pose underlying the regulations, the impact on the parties, and 
the degree of capriciousness in the agency’s action.68
b. Bowen  
 The cases 
of the pre-Bowen era show that courts, through the application 
of complex balancing analyses, worked to effectuate statutory 
purpose.  
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court clarified the law 
regarding retroactive rulemaking.69 In Bowen, the Court con-
sidered a challenge by hospitals in Washington, D.C. to retroac-
tive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services.70 On June 30, 1981, the Secretary promulgat-
ed a set of regulations stating the costs for which hospitals par-
ticipating in Medicare could be reimbursed.71 After a district 
court invalidated those regulations for violating the procedural 
requirements of the APA,72 the Secretary reissued the regula-
tions on November 26, 1984.73 He made the regulations retroac-
tive to July 1, 1981, and proceeded to collect over $2 million in 
past over-payments to Washington hospitals.74 The parties 
challenged the retroactive effect of the regulations.75
 
 65. Id. 
 
 66. Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 
1077, 1080 (1st Cir. 1977). 
 67. Mason Gen. Hosp. v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 809 
F.2d 1220, 1229–30 (6th Cir. 1987).  
 68. Id. at 1227–28. 
 69. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). 
 70. Id. at 206.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 206–07.  
 73. Id. at 207. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
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The district court applied the balancing test found in Re-
tail, Wholesale & Department Store Union and found that the 
retroactive rules in this case were not justified.76 The D.C. Cir-
cuit invalidated the rules by arguing that the language of the 
APA forbids retroactive rulemaking.77 The Supreme Court af-
firmed on different grounds, laying out a clear new standard for 
considering retroactive rulemaking.78 The Court noted that 
“[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law” and held that “a statu-
tory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a 
general matter, be understood to encompass the power to 
promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by 
Congress in express terms.”79 The Court found no such express 
authority in the statutory language authorizing the Secretary 
to make the rules in question and invalidated them.80
In his concurrence to the Bowen decision, Justice Scalia 
provided reasoning for the decision by examining the language 
of the APA.
 
81 He argued that the APA’s definition of the term 
“rule,” which describes a rule in part as “an agency statement 
of general or particular applicability and future effect,”82 prohib-
its rules that have retroactive effect.83 Justice Scalia articulated 
a distinction between primary retroactivity, which alters “the 
past legal consequences of past actions,”84 and secondary retro-
activity, which has “exclusively future effect” but does “affect 
past transactions.”85 He asserted that rules that have secondary 
retroactive effect are valid unless unreasonable.86
 
 76. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. Bowen, Nos. 85-1845, 35-2545, 85-2862, 
1986 WL 53398, at *7–9 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 1986).  
 He reaf-
firmed that agencies can make retroactive policies through ad-
 77. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 207–08. 
 78. Id. at 208. 
 79. Id. (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. at 209–16 (analyzing the relevant statutes and finding no express 
authorization from Congress of retroactive rulemaking).  
 81. Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I write separately because I find it 
incomplete to discuss general principles of administrative law without refer-
ence to the basic structural legislation which is the embodiment of those prin-
ciples, the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”).  
 82. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 83. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 216–18 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that other 
interpretations of “future effect” would render the statutory provision, or the 
statute’s distinction between rulemaking and adjudication, meaningless). 
 84. Id. at 219. 
 85. Id. at 219–20. 
 86. Id. at 220.  
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judication87 and speculated that some statutes provide implicit 
authorization for retroactive rulemaking.88 Specifically, Justice 
Scalia raised the example of an agency missing a statutory 
deadline, stating that such an instance might present an excep-
tion from the general rule and implicit authorization for rea-
sonable retroactive rulemaking.89
c. Post-Bowen 
  
In the years since Bowen, lower courts have considered the 
general question of retroactive rulemaking in greater detail. 
The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged that the Court’s retroactivi-
ty rules can be difficult to apply90 and, in order to clarify the 
type of retroactivity to which Bowen applies, has adopted Jus-
tice Scalia’s distinction between primary and secondary retro-
activity.91 Agencies have mitigated some of the effects of the bar 
on retroactive rulemaking by making interpretative rules,92 
claiming the good-cause exception to the requirements of the 
APA in order to issue rules more quickly,93 and establishing 
policy through adjudication.94
Specifically, the D.C. Circuit has also considered Justice 
Scalia’s proposed exception and the question of whether retro-
active rulemaking is justified when an agency misses a statuto-
  
 
 87. Id. at 224 (“[N]othing prevents the agency from acting retroactively 
through adjudication.”).  
 88. Id. (“It may even be that implicit authorization of particular retroac-
tive rulemaking can be found in existing legislation.”).  
 89. Id. at 224–25. 
 90. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 859 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (“The general legal principles governing retroactivity are relatively easy 
to state, although not as easy to apply.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 567 F.3d 659, 670–
71 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (recognizing that a rule that has primary retroactive effect, 
by subjecting past conduct to new penalties, is invalid, while a rule that has 
secondary retroactive effect because it “upsets expectations,” is invalid only if 
arbitrary and capricious). 
 92. See, e.g., Farmers Tel. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 184 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 
1999) (“We agree with the FCC that the question of retroactivity does not arise 
in the present case because its ruling is merely interpretative.”). But see 
Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“As 
for the retroactivity issue, we hold that courts cannot award HCFA recovery 
out of deference to interpretive rules that did not exist when the transactions 
at issue were conducted.”). 
 93. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 488 (noting that while an agency cannot 
give a rule retroactive effect, it can use the good-cause exception to avoid 
APA’s procedural requirements and make the rule more quickly). 
 94. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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ry deadline.95 In National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, the 
D.C. Circuit considered a challenge to a set of regulations dic-
tating the percentage of renewable fuels required in gasoline.96 
EPA had missed a statutory deadline for promulgating the reg-
ulations and applied them retroactively to the entire 2010 cal-
endar year.97 Without deciding whether the regulation had 
primary or secondary retroactive effect,98 the court stated that 
Congress had implicitly authorized EPA’s promulgation of ret-
roactive rules in this case.99 The court adopted Justice Scalia’s 
view from the concurrence in Bowen that a statute might im-
plicitly authorize reasonable retroactive rulemaking when an 
agency misses a statutory deadline.100 Without discussing the 
concerns that usually arise when courts consider retroactive 
rulemaking,101 the court supported its holding by noting that 
the statute in question, as written, seemed to forecast the pos-
sibility of some retroactivity.102 Furthermore, the court support-
ed its holding with the judgment that the “Final Rule’s retroac-
tivity does not make ‘the [regulated parties’] situation 
worse.’”103
 
 95. See Sierra Club v. Whitman, 285 F.3d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“There 
may be an exception for situations in which the ‘statute prescribes a deadline 
by which particular rules must be in effect’ and the ‘agency misses that dead-
line.’ Even then, retroactivity must be ‘reasonable’ . . . .” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 224–25 (1988))); 
Celtronix Telemetry, Inc. v. FCC, 272 F.3d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating 
that the D.C. Circuit holds Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Bowen as 
“substantially authoritative” (citing and quoting Bergerco Can. v. U.S. Treas-
ury Dep’t, 129 F.3d 189, 192–93 (D.C. Cir. 1997))). 
 
 96. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d 145, 147–52 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 162 (neglecting to decide whether the rule had primary or sec-
ondary retroactive effect). 
 99. Id. at 162–64. 
 100. Id. at 162–63 (“This court has treated Justice Scalia’s concurring opin-
ion as substantially authoritative . . . .” (quoting Celtronix Telemetry, Inc., 272 
F.3d at 588) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 101. Id. at 163 (stating merely that traditional issues arising in the context 
of retroactive rulemaking are not applicable in this case). 
 102. Id. (explaining that even if EPA had promulgated rules by the appli-
cable deadlines, the requirement of a sixty-day congressional review period 
would still have forced the agency to either not abide by the law in full or ap-
ply rules retroactively).  
 103. Id. (contrasting EPA’s legitimate exercise of retroactive rulemaking 
power with the illegitimate retroactive regulation in Sierra Club v. Whitman, 
285 F.3d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
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In a dissent to the decision to deny a rehearing en banc, 
Judge Brown argued that the holding in National Petrochemi-
cal & Refiners Ass’n conflicts with the Supreme Court’s rule in 
Bowen.104 She suggested that if Congress meant to fill the gap 
between a missed deadline and promulgation of the final rule, 
it could give an agency that power expressly or use other mech-
anisms to change the status quo rules until a final rule is 
promulgated.105 She noted that the holding is not consistent 
with the “textual emphasis on ‘future effect’” found in Justice 
Scalia’s APA argument against retroactive rulemaking.106 She 
also reasoned that just because the statutory provision raises 
the possibility of retroactive action does not mean it provides 
the sort of express approval of retroactive action required by 
Bowen.107 Finally, she warned against the effects of giving a 
“‘laggard agency’” the power to resolve problems caused by its 
own delay.108
II.  TRADITIONAL RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING 
REASONING FAILS TO SOLVE THE TARDY-AGENCY 
PROBLEM   
 In summary, while agencies generally need con-
gressional authorization to make retroactive rules, courts are 
debating whether agencies can act retroactively after missing 
deadlines.  
At its core, the tardy-agency problem represents a clash of 
competing presumptions. And while agencies and regulated 
parties count on courts to resolve this tension, the reasoning 
courts typically use in response to retroactive rulemaking fails 
to address the tardy-agency problem.  
 
 104. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n II, 643 F.3d 958, 960 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (Brown, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing 
that the Scalia exception conflicts with the Supreme Court’s clear rule in Bow-
en). 
 105. Id. at 961. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 962 (“[J]ust because a statutory ‘provision on its face permits 
some form of retroactive action’ does not mean Congress intended to grant 
general ‘authority for the retroactive promulgation of . . . rules.’” (quoting 
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 209 (1988))). 
 108. Id. (quoting Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299, 1303 
(D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
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A. COMPETING PRESUMPTIONS AND THE INSUFFICIENCY OF 
BOWEN 
The general rule against retroactive rulemaking, or the 
Bowen rule, is a presumption that Congress, unless it explicitly 
says otherwise, does not intend to grant an agency the power to 
make retroactive rules.109 In other words, without the express 
word of Congress, an agency is lacking a certain power (i.e., the 
power to make rules retroactively). At first glance, this pre-
sumption might seem to address any and all retroactivity cases. 
However, what makes the tardy-agency problem distinct is the 
existence of an agency deadline. The tardy-agency problem im-
plicates another presumption: the Barnhart rule. Where Bowen 
presumes an agency lacks a certain power, the Barnhart rule 
presumes that, absent explicit language to the contrary, an 
agency retains the power to act after it has missed a statutory 
deadline.110
Because the Barnhart case did not deal with retroactivi-
ty,
 In other words, despite the lack of an express word 
of Congress, an agency does have a certain power (i.e., the pow-
er to act even after missing a relevant deadline).  
111 it does not fully collide with the presumption against ret-
roactive rulemaking. Still, the two presumptions do conflict in 
the sense that the Barnhart rule acknowledges the complex 
congressional intent underlying a statutory deadline and rec-
ognizes that an agency can sometimes retain the power to meet 
the requirements of a statute, even when the statutory dead-
line has passed.112 Barnhart could be read to indicate that, 
where Congress has done the work of making precise declara-
tions about when certain policies should apply, agencies should 
meet those temporal requirements, even where retroactivity is 
required.113 Indeed, Bowen did not foreclose Congress’s ability 
to implicitly authorize retroactivity114
 
 109. See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208–09. 
 and so it is possible that 
 110. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159 (2003). 
 111. See id. at 152–53. 
 112. Id. at 159 (refusing to interpret a statutory deadline to mean that 
Congress intends for a grant of power or authority to end at the deadline); see 
also Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 22, at 954–55 (discussing the complex 
considerations underlying the holding in Barnhart). 
 113. Cf. PIERCE, supra note 19, at 483–85 (criticizing Bowen, explaining its 
potentially devastating effects, and arguing that agencies should retain the 
power to act retroactively after a deadline, unless Congress says otherwise).  
 114. See, e.g., Brief for Federal Respondent in Opposition to Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n III, 132 S. 
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a clear deadline from Congress could constitute authorization 
to act retroactively.  
The possibility that Congress could implicitly authorize 
retroactivity and the competing presumptions inherent in the 
tardy-agency problem weakens the power of the Bowen rule. 
Imagine, for example, that Congress enacts a significant do-
mestic policy program. As a part of the program, it sets a num-
ber of deadlines for relevant agencies to promulgate critical 
regulations. These deadlines are interdependent and it is vital 
that the agencies promulgate regulations that encompass the 
time periods that are covered by the deadlines. If the agencies 
miss the relevant deadlines, Barnhart assures them they do re-
tain the power to act. In this scenario, the idea that Bowen 
steps in and strips the agency of the power to effectuate Con-
gress’s temporal intent seems faulty.115
B. THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE APA 
 At a minimum, it calls 
for a deeper analysis into the reasoning that generally applies 
in retroactivity cases, to determine whether it adequately ad-
dresses the tardy-agency problem.  
In explaining the bar on retroactive rulemaking, judges 
may look to the language of the APA.116 Justice Scalia, in a con-
currence explaining the rationale for the bar on retroactive 
rulemaking, points to the definition of the term “rule,” found in 
Section 551 of the APA.117 The APA defines a “rule” as “the 
whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect.”118
In Bowen, the express language of the APA was sufficient 
to justify a bar on retroactive rulemaking.
 While the argument that this 
definition bars retroactive rulemaking may sufficiently address 
some retroactivity cases, it does not solve the tardy-agency 
problem. 
119
 
Ct. 571 (2011) (No. 11-102) (pointing out that both parties agreed that Bowen 
did not foreclose implicit congressional authorization of retroactivity).  
 The controversy in 
 115. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 19, at 483 (arguing that Congress likely 
does not intend to restrict retroactivity when it grants an agency extensive 
rulemaking power).  
 116. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (justifying the bar on retroactive rulemaking by exam-
ining the express language of the APA). 
 117. See, e.g., id. (examining the definition of “rule” found in Section 551 
and focusing on the term “future effect”). 
 118. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 119. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208. 
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that case involved the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices’s power to promulgate rules governing to what extent 
Medicare reimbursed healthcare providers.120 The statutory 
provision granting him this power contained no deadline.121 A 
court struck down the Secretary’s first rule governing the reim-
bursement rate for healthcare providers in Washington, D.C.122 
The Secretary then promulgated a new regulation, following 
the proper procedures, which reached back and reinstated the 
limit on reimbursement payments included in his earlier 
rule.123 In Bowen, Congress provided no explicit guidance on 
what time frame the relevant agency should attempt to cover 
with its rulemaking power. When an agency has the discretion 
to make a rule and no direction from Congress on when the rule 
should apply, the only guidance a court has on the timing of a 
rule is the APA’s general statement that rules should have “fu-
ture effect.”124
The tardy-agency problem is different because Congress 
has stepped in and provided specific requirements for the tim-
ing of the rule. In National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, for 
example, the relevant statute sets out minimum volumes of re-
newable fuels, increasing the volume each successive year 
through 2022.
 In other words, a court has no indication from 
Congress regarding the timing of the rule, but it does know 
that Congress generally defines rules as having “future effect.” 
Thus, the “future effect” language sufficiently justifies the bar 
on retroactive rulemaking because it provides the only indica-
tion from Congress as to the timing and applicability of the 
rule. 
125 At the same time, the statute sets out a dead-
line for EPA to meet in promulgating regulations regarding the 
volumes of renewable fuels, stating that “[n]ot later than 1 year 
after December 19, 2007, the Administrator shall revise the 
regulations under this paragraph to ensure that transportation 
fuel sold or introduced into commerce in the United States . . . 
on an annual average basis, contains at least the applicable 
volume . . . .”126
 
 120. Id. at 205–06. 
 Here Congress has provided some sense of the 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (2006).  
 122. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 206–07 (recounting a lower court’s decision to 
strike down the Secretary’s first rule due to his failure to follow the proper 
procedures under the APA).  
 123. Id.  
 124. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006). 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. I 2007). 
 126. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i). 
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specific requirements it plans to apply to fuel producers and re-
finers and has set an explicit deadline for the regulating agency 
to work out the details.127
Although the APA may define the word “rule” using the 
term “future effect,”
  
128 the relevant organic statute in the tardy-
agency problem includes a specific requirement from Congress 
that the rule be promulgated by a certain date. Congress has 
indicated that, for any number of important reasons, it wishes 
the rule to take effect on a certain date. To hold that the defini-
tion of “rule” found in the APA would bar retroactive rulemak-
ing in a case like National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n is to 
give that language far too much power.129 It would allow the 
APA to neuter Congress’s intent that agencies should promul-
gate certain policies to cover certain timeframes, simply be-
cause an agency has missed a statutory deadline.130 Instead, 
where Congress has provided in the APA and the organic stat-
ute two sets of temporal guidance about a rule, it is more likely 
that Congress still intends for the rule to apply to the specific 
time period targeted in the organic statute. This is especially 
true because, traditionally in administrative law, if there is a 
conflict between the APA and the organic statute, the organic 
statute governs.131 The problem with using the APA’s language 
to justify a bar on retroactive rulemaking in the tardy-agency 
context is particularly apparent in the case of National Petro-
chemical & Refiners Ass’n, where Congress enacted a complex, 
multiyear regulatory scheme132
 
 127. Id.  
 and where, even if EPA had met 
the applicable deadlines, the agency would have needed to give 
 128. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). 
 129. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 484 (arguing that the “future effect” ar-
gument goes too far and misconstrues the language of the APA).  
 130. See id. 
 131. See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 486 n.59 (noting that the APA’s 
provisions serve as gap-fillers and that the relevant organic statute trumps 
the APA where the two conflict); see also 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2006) (declaring that 
a subsequent statute will not supersede the APA unless “it does so expressly”).  
 132. Indeed, the intervenors in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n 
seize on the structure of the organic statute to argue that the EPA regulation 
in question does not have primary retroactive effect. Nat’l Petrochemical & Re-
finers Ass’n I, 630 F.3d 145, 159–60 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recounting the argument 
of the intervenors that the level of detail in the statute essentially limits the 
retroactive effect of the regulation to secondary retroactiveness). The D.C. Cir-
cuit did not rule on the intervenors’ argument and instead accepted that the 
rule has retroactive effect and validated that retroactivity. Id. at 163–64.  
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its rule some retroactive effect to cover the entire time period 
targeted by Congress.133
In the traditional retroactive rulemaking scenario, as in 
Bowen, Congress has provided no guidance regarding the tim-
ing of the promulgation of a rule. The only guidance courts 
have is the APA’s provision that defines rules as having “future 
effect.”
 
134
C. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RULES AND ADJUDICATION AND 
THE AVAILABILITY OF ADJUDICATION 
 In the tardy-agency problem, Congress has instead 
provided clear guidance that the rules in question should be 
promulgated by certain dates and, therefore, should apply to a 
certain timeframe. Relying on the language of the APA to bar 
retroactive action in the tardy-agency context gives the APA’s 
language greater power than it deserves and flouts congres-
sional intent on critical policies. This key rationale for the Bow-
en rule does not justify a bar on retroactive rulemaking in the 
tardy-agency context.  
Courts can also justify the bar on retroactive rulemaking 
by pointing to the distinction between rulemaking and adjudi-
cation found in the APA. Justice Scalia, for example, argues 
that rulemaking is by definition prospective under the APA and 
that the retroactive/prospective distinction is one critical way to 
distinguish between rulemaking and adjudication.135 Justice 
Scalia went further and pointed out that because an agency can 
make retroactive policy through adjudication, it has other ave-
nues available to take needed retroactive action.136
This distinction, used by courts and found within the APA, 
is unhelpful in the context of the tardy-agency problem. Just as 
an excessive reliance on the words “future effect” fails to ad-
dress the tardy-agency problem, a myopic focus on rules being 
prospective and adjudication being retroactive fails to take into 
account Congress’s actions in the tardy-agency context. In the 
tardy-agency context, Congress has made a determination that 
a rule must be promulgated by a certain date, demonstrating 
  
 
 133. Id. at 163 (“The structure of the [organic statute] demonstrates that 
Congress anticipated the possibility of some retroactive impacts . . . .”). 
 134. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006). 
 135. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218–22 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (examining the APA’s distinction between rules and 
adjudicatory proceedings). 
 136. See id. at 224. 
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its intent that the rule apply to a certain time period.137 Just 
because an agency has missed a statutory deadline does not 
change the fact that Congress wants a certain rule promulgat-
ed by a certain date. If an agency missed a statutory deadline 
and then finished promulgating a rule retroactive to that dead-
line, it would not confuse the distinction between rulemaking 
and adjudication.138
In National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, for example, 
EPA was not taking action that confuses the characteristics of 
rules and adjudication. Instead, the agency was acting to meet 
congressional requirements, even if later than required.
 Instead, it would merely mean that an 
agency was acting to meet the demands of Congress in a specif-
ic statutory provision.  
139 Fur-
thermore, in that case, if EPA had met the relevant deadlines, 
its regulation would still have either had retroactive effect or 
not applied to the entire time period targeted by Congress.140
Additionally, the availability of adjudication to make ret-
roactive policy does not address the tardy-agency problem. In 
National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, for example, an agen-
cy would struggle to use individual adjudicatory proceedings to 
apply its specific interpretation of the statute’s renewable fuels 
requirements to individual refiners. Neither of these traditional 
justifications for the bar on retroactive rulemaking sufficiently 
addresses the tardy-agency problem.  
 
This built-in possibility of retroactivity demonstrates that, in 
the organic statute in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, 
Congress was less concerned with a distinction between types 
of agency action based on their temporal applicability, and 
more on exercising its will through policies that take effect at 
certain times. The existence of an explicit statutory deadline 
differentiates the tardy-agency problem from the traditional 
retroactive rulemaking problem found in Bowen and shows that 
reliance on the distinction between adjudication and rulemak-
ing is insufficient to justify a bar on retroactivity. 
 
 137. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 22, at 937–49 (discussing the im-
portant meaning and intent underlying statutory deadlines).  
 138. Indeed, some administrative law scholars have responded to the rule-
adjudication distinction argument by pointing to the fact that some laws and 
regulations can be applied retroactively and it does not change the fact that 
they are laws and regulations. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 19, at 483–84. 
 139. See Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d 145, 163 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
 140. See id. 
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D. NOTICE CONCERNS 
Courts also note that the lack of notice provided by retroac-
tive rulemaking is problematic.141 In a case like Bowen, the lack 
of notice creates obvious hardship for the regulated parties. The 
statute in Bowen contained no statutory deadline.142 Once the 
original rule was struck down procedurally, the regulated par-
ties had no notice that the Department of Health and Human 
Services was going to reach back and grab $2 million in funds, 
years beyond when the providers had received the relevant re-
imbursements.143
However, the regulated parties in National Petrochemicals 
& Refiners Ass’n, as the court in the case noted, did have “am-
ple notice” of the requirements that would be included in the 
ultimate retroactive regulation.
 The facts of Bowen demonstrate that this lack 
of notice could wreak havoc on the ability of a regulated party 
to plan and predict costs, which Congress would presumably 
like to avoid. 
144 EPA had provided some pre-
promulgation warning of its regulatory goals and the possibility 
that the regulation would have retroactive effect.145 Moreover, 
the statute itself made clear that Congress was expanding its 
renewable fuels program over a multiyear period and that EPA 
would need to act to promulgate rules for this program by cer-
tain dates.146 In the tardy-agency context, unlike in Bowen, the 
existence of a statutory deadline provides parties with a fair 
warning that regulations are coming. Granted, this warning 
may not include specific requirements or guidance.147
 
 141. See Geoffrey C. Weien, Note, Retroactive Rulemaking, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 749, 756–57 (2007) (discussing the tendency of courts to cite the 
principle of fair notice as a reason for the bar on retroactive rulemaking). 
 But the 
statutory deadline would certainly provide more notice than 
the agency did in Bowen. Thus, a notice argument fails to thor-
oughly justify a bar on retroactive rulemaking in the tardy-
agency context. 
 142. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 205 (1988) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)). 
 143. See id. at 207 (“Respondents, a group of seven hospitals who had bene-
fited from the invalidation of the 1981 schedule, were required to return over 
$2 million in reimbursement payments.”). 
 144. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 163–64 (describing 
the notice provided to regulated parties through the statute and notices of 
proposed rulemaking). 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See supra note 4. 
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E. THE GOOD-CAUSE EXCEPTION 
Agencies have sometimes used the good-cause exception in 
the APA as an alternative tool that helps mitigate the effects of 
the bar on retroactive rulemaking.148 Section 553 of the APA 
requires that agencies promulgate a substantive rule according 
to notice-and-comment procedures.149 There is an exception 
from this requirement when an agency finds “good cause” and 
publishes that finding in the rule.150 Although an agency cannot 
promulgate a rule retroactively, it can use the good-cause ex-
ception to promulgate a rule much more quickly, avoiding the 
onerous requirements of Section 553 of the APA.151
This strategy may be an effective tactic when an agency is 
simply trying to move quickly and faces no deadline, but it does 
not do enough in the tardy-agency problem scenario. Looking 
again at National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, the good-
cause exception would not have helped EPA. In that case, EPA 
had long since missed the late 2008 deadline to promulgate 
regulations.
 In the con-
text of the tardy-agency problem, if an agency were to miss a 
deadline, it could avoid added delay by promulgating the rule 
as quickly as possible. 
152
 
 148. See PIERCE, supra note 
 After announcing its final set of regulations in 
mid-2010 with the goal of applying them to the entire 2010 cal-
endar year, using the good-cause exception would merely have 
saved EPA some additional time. EPA would still have been 
outside the timeframe envisioned by Congress and the delay 
would have obstructed Congress’s desire to implement an ongo-
ing, multiyear regulatory program. Furthermore, this assumes 
that EPA could have argued it actually had good cause to 
promulgate the rule without using the APA’s notice-and-
comment procedures. It is doubtful that every agency facing a 
tardy-agency problem would be able to prove actual good cause. 
As National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n demonstrates, the 
good-cause exception does not solve the tardy-agency problem.  
19, at 488 (explaining the tendency of agencies 
to use the good-cause exception in Section 553 of the APA to make rules more 
quickly, as an alternative to retroactive rulemaking).  
 149. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
 150. Id.  
 151. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 488. 
 152. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d 145, 147–52 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (recounting EPA’s timeline of action under the relevant organic 
statute). 
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The preceding discussion demonstrates that the reasoning 
behind the Bowen rule, and the alternative strategies agencies 
use to work around the Bowen rule, will not sufficiently address 
the tardy-agency problem. The failure of these explanations, 
however, does not mean the bar on retroactivity should be lifted 
entirely in the tardy-agency context. Indeed, even before Bow-
en, courts treated retroactivity carefully and closely examined 
congressional intent.153
F. POLICY 
 A brief discussion of the policy concerns 
implicated by the tardy-agency problem shows that the solution 
requires more than just an unnuanced blanket approach.  
The tardy-agency problem implicates significant policy 
concerns. First, courts express the concern that allowing retro-
active rulemaking will increase the tendency of agencies to 
miss deadlines since agencies’ incentive to meet deadlines will 
decrease.154
A different policy concern also warrants consideration. 
Barring an agency from promulgating rules retroactively could 
make it easier for an agency that disagrees with the policy 
Congress has made in the organic statute in question to try to 
obstruct the policy from being implemented.
 This is a relevant concern, because giving agencies 
the express power to promulgate retroactive rules after missing 
a deadline certainly could impact the urgency with which agen-
cies approach statutory deadlines. However, the fact that ret-
roactivity could be allowed in only limited circumstances (i.e., 
when the agency has not missed a deadline due to excessive de-
lay or sloth) demonstrates that this policy concern does not 
compellingly support a complete bar on such retroactive rule-
making because it is possible to address this concern without 
adopting a blanket prohibition on retroactivity.  
155
 
 153. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 Imagine, for ex-
ample, that Congress and the President enact a policy program 
that requires years of implementation. However, in the midst of 
implementation, a new President is elected. If this new Presi-
dent opposes the underlying program, his or her agents 
throughout the executive branch may slow implementation in 
 154. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n II, 643 F.3d 958, 958–62 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (Brown, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (noting 
that the panel’s decision in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I “encour-
ages lethargic administration”). 
 155. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 22, at 932–37 (analyzing the rea-
sons Congress uses deadlines and the potential administrative conflicts that 
can arise between a President and a Congress of different parties).  
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order to lessen the impact of the legislation. The agencies 
would know that whenever they miss a statutory deadline, the 
required regulations would not apply retroactively to that stat-
utory deadline. Having the reasonable power to promulgate 
retroactive regulations, however, would ensure that an agency 
would not be able to obstruct the will of Congress through its 
own tardiness 
The tardy-agency problem presents a clash of presump-
tions. Although interested parties would hope courts could re-
solve this tension, the reasoning courts frequently use in retro-
active rulemaking cases, and the Bowen rule that reasoning 
supports, fail to address the problem. The tardy-agency prob-
lem warrants a new approach to help courts and agencies navi-
gate the murky waters of retroactivity and statutory deadlines. 
But that approach should be nuanced, in order to reflect the 
complex policy concerns implicated by the tardy-agency prob-
lem.  
III.  A NEW APPROACH: FOCUSING ON CONGRESSIONAL 
INTENT   
Any solution to the tardy-agency problem must respect ex-
isting precedent, respond to the various policy concerns pre-
sented by the issue, and find support in administrative law. 
Furthermore, any new approach must succeed where the tradi-
tional retroactive rulemaking reasoning and doctrines have 
failed, by addressing the unique issues presented by the tardy-
agency problem.  
A. THE CONGRESSIONAL-INTENT APPROACH REFLECTS THE 
UNIQUE NATURE OF THE TARDY-AGENCY PROBLEM  
When faced with an agency that has missed a deadline for 
promulgating a rule and has promulgated that rule retroactive-
ly, a court should not apply a blanket presumption barring ret-
roactive rulemaking.156 At the same time, the court should not 
merely assume that because an agency has missed a deadline, 
it automatically retains the power to make a reasonable rule 
retroactive.157
 
 156. A blanket presumption is what Judge Brown proposes. Nat’l Petro-
chemical & Refiners Ass’n II, 643 F.3d at 958–62 (Brown, J., dissenting from 
the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 Instead, out from under the umbrella of Bowen, 
 157. The Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I court comes close to allow-
ing reasonable rules to be automatically retroactive, after focusing on the 
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the court should conduct a searching inquiry to determine 
whether Congress has implicitly granted retroactive rulemak-
ing power in the statutory deadline provision in question. 
Under this test, a court would examine whether Congress’s 
deadline demonstrates a temporal directive to make a rule ret-
roactive to the time period in question, trumping the Bowen 
rule. The court would make this determination by closely ana-
lyzing the statutory scheme at issue. This analysis would re-
quire a court to analyze a statute clearly and conspicuously, dif-
ferent than the rather opaque and muddled approach taken in 
National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n. Evidence of implicit 
congressional intent could be that a statute is complex and in-
terdependent and that its regulatory structure, in order to be 
effective, requires regulations to be promulgated and applied to 
certain timeframes.158
 This approach rejects a blanket presumption or rule. In-
stead, this approach is intensely focused on gauging congres-
sional intent. If Congress has made a conscious policy choice to 
regulate the timeframe in question, that intention would not be 
upended because an agency missed a statutory deadline. The 
congressional intent gleaned by applying the factors above 
would, essentially, amount to the authorization for retroactivity 
required in Bowen. However, if Congress did not demonstrate 
such an intention, retroactivity would be barred, especially 
when the hardship on the parties is great. This approach is 
more systematic and reliable than the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in 
National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, which discussed the 
peculiar scenario in that case and failed to ground its holding 
in one line of reasoning.
 This approach could also take into ac-
count extreme hardship to the parties from retroactive rule-
making because Congress, in providing or failing to provide im-
plicit approval for an agency to make retroactive rules, would 
also presumably consider the impact of such a power on the 
regulated parties.  
159 The congressional-intent test also 
differs from the old Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Un-
ion balancing test,160
 
unique peculiarities of the statute in question and applying a weak balancing 
test. 630 F.3d at 162–63.  
 because it is concerned solely with Con-
 158. See, e.g., id. at 147–52 (describing Congress’s multiyear regulatory 
framework, which increased requirements on fuel refiners in such a way that 
failing to adhere to the statutory goals in one year could impact adherence to 
the goals in successive years).  
 159. See supra Part I.B.2.c. 
 160. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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gress’s implicit grant of power and not with the balancing of 
multiple fuzzy factors. However, this test is consistent with the 
underlying focus, in both the pre-Bowen balancing test and the 
Bowen bright-line rule,161
Most importantly, this test provides a solution to the in-
creasingly urgent tardy-agency problem, while taking into ac-
count both of the serious policy concerns addressed in Part II.F. 
Allowing retroactivity any time an agency misses a statutory 
deadline would render statutory deadlines meaningless. Know-
ing that courts under this approach will be looking closely at 
organic statutes to glean congressional intent, and that courts 
will have the power to bar retroactivity if the hardship on the 
parties is truly egregious, will encourage agencies to take stat-
utory deadlines seriously and to consider carefully Congress’s 
intent in enacting deadlines in the first place (i.e., does Con-
gress truly mean for the regulation in question to be in place at 
the deadline?). However, this approach also gives agencies the 
power to act retroactively, reducing the likelihood that an 
agency might use the bar on retroactive rulemaking to delay 
and obstruct the implementation of a policy with which it disa-
grees. An agency still might purposely choose not to make ret-
roactive rules, but, when faced with pressure from Congress 
and stakeholders to take action on congressional priorities, the 
congressional-intent test would make it much harder for agen-
cies to hide behind the tactic of delay.  
 with gleaning the will of Congress.  
Practically, courts would implement this approach by 
enunciating it in a decision, which would then provide guidance 
to agencies. It is important to note that the congressional-
intent approach would not conflict with Bowen. Instead, it 
merely clarifies the Bowen holding, much as other post-Bowen 
decisions have done in other ways,162 by acknowledging that an 
explicit statutory deadline from Congress can, in some circum-
stances, amount to the required authorization from Congress to 
engage in retroactive rulemaking.163
 
 161. See supra Parts I.B.2.a, I.B.2.b. 
 Once courts have estab-
lished this new test, agencies would need to consider it in mak-
ing any decision regarding the promulgation of retroactive 
rules. While this decision may leave some ambiguity or uncer-
tainty for agencies as they make decisions about rulemaking, it 
is necessary given the wide variety of statutory and regulatory 
 162. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.  
 163. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that the Bowen 
case did not foreclose implicit authorization of retroactivity by Congress).  
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schemes. As National Petrochemicals & Refiners Ass’n demon-
strates, statutory schemes can include complex delegations to 
agencies combined with specific requirements and mandates.164
B. OTHER AREAS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SUPPORT THE 
CONGRESSIONAL-INTENT APPROACH 
 
Complex statutes that require significant action on the part of 
agencies by particular deadlines warrant close congressional-
intent analysis to determine if retroactivity is warranted. 
The congressional-intent test, while a break from the tradi-
tional bar on retroactive rulemaking found in Bowen165 and 
from the vague reasoning utilized by the D.C. Circuit in Na-
tional Petrochemicals & Refiners Ass’n,166
In other key cases, courts do hone in on congressional in-
tent when considering agency power.
 is consistent with the 
approach taken in other areas of administrative law.  
167 In fact, congressional 
intent is a key factor in the complex doctrine that determines 
the level of scrutiny to be applied to an agency’s interpretation 
of a statute.168 Agencies regularly interpret the statutes they 
administer.169 But judges have long debated to what extent 
courts should adhere to agencies’ interpretations of statutes 
that govern them.170 Various levels of scrutiny exist and courts 
make the decision about how much deference to afford an agen-
cy’s interpretation by looking to congressional intent.171 Indeed, 
courts, under the test in United States v. Mead Corp., look spe-
cifically to the statutory scheme in question and to the powers 
delegated to the agency to determine whether Congress intend-
ed for the agency to have broad interpretative powers.172
 
 164. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d 145, 147–52 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (explaining the renewable fuels program’s underlying statutory and 
regulatory scheme, which was at issue in the case). 
 For 
example, Congress might enact a statute that creates an agen-
cy and, implicitly, give the agency the power to interpret its 
originating statute. Conversely, Congress may create an agency 
and give it minimal interpretative power. Either way, under 
 165. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1988). 
 166. See Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 162–64. 
 167. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001). 
 168. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax 
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1547–54 (2006).  
 169. See id. at 1548–49. 
 170. See id. at 1549. 
 171. See id. at 1548–54. 
 172. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227–31.  
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Mead, courts look to congressional intent to determine court 
scrutiny and agency power.173
This approach is very consistent with the congressional-
intent solution to the tardy-agency problem. Just as the Court 
in Mead looks to the statutory scheme to glean the interpreta-
tive power Congress hopes to give an agency,
  
174
C. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL-INTENT 
APPROACH 
 a court under 
the congressional-intent test would look to the scheme sur-
rounding the statutory deadline to determine if Congress in-
tended to give the agency retroactive rulemaking power. The 
Mead analysis supports the congressional-intent solution to the 
tardy-agency problem.  
One criticism of the congressional-intent approach could be 
that it runs counter to Supreme Court precedent in Bowen and 
is a roundabout attempt to allow retroactive rulemaking in lim-
ited circumstances. But this criticism misses a key element of 
the Bowen decision: that the organic statute in Bowen included 
no congressional deadline and left no indication of congression-
al intent regarding timing.175 The Court was left with the APA 
and little else.176
Critics could also contend that this approach is repetitive 
or unnecessary. One could argue the approach is similar to 
what the D.C. Circuit used in National Petrochemical & Refin-
ers Ass’n and fails to offer much more than the standard bal-
ancing test applied in pre-Bowen cases like Retail, Wholesale & 
Department Store Union.
 The tardy-agency problem is different because 
Congress has acted in the organic statute by providing an ex-
plicit statutory deadline. This deadline distinguished the facts 
of the tardy-agency problem from the facts of Bowen and may 
be seen, after a thorough analysis, to represent the required 
authorization from Congress to act retroactively. 
177 This criticism misses the mark, 
however, because the D.C. Circuit failed to articulate a clear 
test in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n178
 
 173. See id. at 218. 
 and the pre-
Bowen balancing test included a number of complex and equal-
 174. See id. at 227–28.  
 175. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 205 (1988) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)). 
 176. See id. at 207. 
 177. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 178. See supra Part I.B.2.c. 
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ly important factors.179 The congressional-intent test is not a 
vague pseudotest and it does not require multifactor balancing. 
Instead, it hones in on congressional intent, recognizing the 
complex meaning that can underlie statutory deadlines. This 
approach introduces a novel inquiry into the retroactive rule-
making jurisprudence, allowing the court the discretion to in-
terpret congressional intent while rejecting both a bright-line 
rule and an excessively unpredictable balancing analysis. Any 
attempt to argue that the approach is unnecessary fails to take 
into account the importance of the tardy-agency problem. 
Agencies are enacting historic levels of regulations and are fac-
ing countless statutory deadlines.180
Finally, critics might argue that the congressional-intent 
test fails to address the notice and uniformity concerns that 
regulated parties might have about any departure from the 
bright-line Bowen rule. A regulated party might argue that this 
approach only guarantees more unpredictable court rulings, 
which leaves regulated parties subject to retroactive rulemak-
ing on a judge’s whim. This critique fails to appreciate the sim-
ple nature of the congressional-intent test and the incentive ef-
fect it will have on agencies. Unlike the pre-Bowen multi-factor 
balancing test,
 Regulated parties are fac-
ing the prospect of retroactive action. And the standard bright-
line rules fail to resolve the problem and implicate serious poli-
cy concerns.  
181
 
 179. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 this approach focuses only on congressional 
intent, through an analysis of the statutory scheme. This is a 
predictable analysis which regulated parties will be able to fol-
low and replicate as courts analyze statutes. More importantly, 
because agencies will know courts are applying this test, they 
will clearly lay out, in advance of any retroactive rulemaking, 
their analysis of a congressional statute and whether it pro-
vides implicit retroactive rulemaking power. In other words, 
the simplicity of this test, and its singular focus on congres-
sional intent, will spur agencies to communicate clearly with 
the parties they regulate and the courts they hope to persuade. 
The agencies themselves will therefore offer some predictability 
to the regulated entities. This test strikes the right balance be-
tween providing clarity to relevant industries, while also giving 
agencies and courts the necessary discretion to enforce Con-
gress’s will.  
 180. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Congress continues to enact complex and complicated stat-
utes, replete with rulemaking deadlines. Yet, as agencies do the 
work of creating rules and, from time to time, miss agency 
deadlines, a question remains as to whether an agency can 
promulgate a rule retroactive to the statutory deadline. This 
seemingly esoteric issue recently sparked a heated debate in 
the D.C. Circuit and may become a commonplace problem. The 
traditional response, that an agency is barred from retroactive 
rulemaking, fails to satisfactorily resolve the issue. But it is al-
so not appropriate simply to grant an agency blanket power to 
make retroactive rules upon missing an agency deadline. Both 
bright-line rules fail to address the problem and carry signifi-
cant policy implications. 
 Courts should adopt an alternative approach to solve the 
tardy-agency problem. Judges should focus on whether a statu-
tory deadline represents implicit congressional intent to give an 
agency the power to make retroactive rules. To engage in this 
inquiry, courts should consider the nature, duration, and com-
plexity of the statutory scheme. This approach gives courts flex-
ibility that a bright-line rule does not, but it also avoids the in-
stability of giving the courts a multi-factor balancing test. And 
it successfully addresses two competing policy concerns. This 
approach will ensure agencies do not take statutory deadlines 
any less seriously, while also guarding against agency efforts to 
use the bar on retroactivity to obstruct Congress’s priorities. 
The time for courts to adopt the congressional-intent approach 
is now. Agencies are promulgating unprecedented numbers of 
rules and are facing countless new deadlines. All the while, key 
federal courts are failing to resolve the tardy-agency problem in 
a consistent and coherent way. The congressional-intent test 
provides such a way, consistent with key precedent and the 
principles of administrative law. 
